Evolution under nonequilibrium dynamics (Q3770341)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4029340
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
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| English | Evolution under nonequilibrium dynamics |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4029340 |
Statements
Evolution under nonequilibrium dynamics (English)
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1987
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ESS
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continuous evolutionary games
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frequency- and population density- dependent selection strategies
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limit cycles
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coalition vectors
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coalition frequency
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compound (average) fitness
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generating functions
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evolutionary stable strategy
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Lotka-Volterra population growth equation
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animal plant growth model
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nonequilibrium situation
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0.92269015
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0.9186742
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0.9139888
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0.91384107
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0.9127228
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0.90524477
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0.89537525
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For modelling population dynamics in an ecosystem continuous evolutionary games under both frequency- and population density-dependent selection strategies are considered. The cases are included that a population may not tend toward asymptotically stable equilibrium points but rather to limit cycles or to chaotic behaviour such as a strange attractor. The mathematical model for an evolutionary game assumes an endless series of generations, a set of strategies, a finite population of players per unit area who draw strategies from the strategy set, and a set of positive average individual fitness functions. Further, these model components are completed by definitions of the terms `coalition vectors', `coalition frequency', `compound (average) fitness', and `(average) generating functions', and a definition is given that a local coalition vector is a so-called evolutionary stable strategy (meaning that the coalition of strategies can persist together through time and that it is resistant to invasion by rare alternative strategies). By examples based on a Lotka-Volterra population growth equation (who is Lokta, as the authors prefer to write tenaciously?) and on an animal plant growth model the existence of evolutionary stable strategies in a nonequilibrium situation is demonstrated.
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