Evolution under nonequilibrium dynamics (Q3770341)

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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4029340
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    Evolution under nonequilibrium dynamics
    scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4029340

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      Evolution under nonequilibrium dynamics (English)
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      1987
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      ESS
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      continuous evolutionary games
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      frequency- and population density- dependent selection strategies
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      limit cycles
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      coalition vectors
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      coalition frequency
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      compound (average) fitness
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      generating functions
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      evolutionary stable strategy
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      Lotka-Volterra population growth equation
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      animal plant growth model
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      nonequilibrium situation
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      For modelling population dynamics in an ecosystem continuous evolutionary games under both frequency- and population density-dependent selection strategies are considered. The cases are included that a population may not tend toward asymptotically stable equilibrium points but rather to limit cycles or to chaotic behaviour such as a strange attractor. The mathematical model for an evolutionary game assumes an endless series of generations, a set of strategies, a finite population of players per unit area who draw strategies from the strategy set, and a set of positive average individual fitness functions. Further, these model components are completed by definitions of the terms `coalition vectors', `coalition frequency', `compound (average) fitness', and `(average) generating functions', and a definition is given that a local coalition vector is a so-called evolutionary stable strategy (meaning that the coalition of strategies can persist together through time and that it is resistant to invasion by rare alternative strategies). By examples based on a Lotka-Volterra population growth equation (who is Lokta, as the authors prefer to write tenaciously?) and on an animal plant growth model the existence of evolutionary stable strategies in a nonequilibrium situation is demonstrated.
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