Non-symmetric discrete General Lotto games (Q378347)

The author studies a non-symmetric variant of the Discrete General Lotto game introduced in [\textit{S. Hart}, Int. J. Game Theory 36, No. 3--4, 441--460 (2008; Zbl 1151.91013)], the model of which can be described with the help of two reals \(a,b>0\) in the form of the following zero-sum two-person game \(\Gamma (a,b)\): There are two players, \(A\) and \(B\), who simultaneously choose discrete probability distributions \(F_A\) and \(F_B\) over non-negative integer numbers, with the only restriction that the expectations under these distributions must be \(a\) and \(b\) for players \(A\) and \(B\), respectively. Let \(X\) and \(Y\) be two random variables with distributions \(F_A\) and \(F_B\), respectively. The payoff of player \(A\) is given by \(H(X,Y) = P(X>Y) - P(Y<X)\). The author completes the characterization of optimal strategies for the players found in Hart's paper to the non-symmetric case \(a\not= b\). He finds a group of completely new atomic strategies, which are used as building components for the optimal strategies. Also, a connection between the General Lotto game and the Colonel Blotto game is described. The author suggests that the results obtained in the paper could be used to find the full characterization of the optimal strategies for the players in the discrete variant of first price all-pay actions.