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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 19143
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 19143 |
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26 June 1992
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philosophy of mathematics
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artificial intelligence
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mind-body-automata problems
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Gödel
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Wittgenstein
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Minsky
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0.7525035738945007
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0.7458211183547974
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0.7337242364883423
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0.707490086555481
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[For the entire collection see Zbl 0734.00012.] This comprehensive paper is an earnest attempt to clarify the network of mind-body-automata problems and to resolve various misunderstandings. The author emphasizes only those connections for which the ``mind is at least as powerful as brain, which is in turn at least as powerful as machine''. The author's approach is to consider only the equivalence or nonequivalence (in some sense) of the three pairs, which disregards some distinctions between the pairs. He believes that most of his remarks only make explicit Gödel's assumptions in several discussions with the author. Strangly, Gödel's proof of the existence of God is never mentioned (the strong realism of Gödel). In addition, the author evaluates some of the writings of Wittgenstein and Minsky in this area. Included is discussion of Gödel's classical remark: ``Either the human mind surpasses all machines'' (in doing number theory) ``or else there exist number-theoretical questions undecidable for the human mind''. The author offers several ``unbaked suggestions'' in the areas of unconsciousness and non-Darwinian evolution of the brain. However, three basic issues are not discussed: (1) What are the benefits and burdens of reinterpreting the classical mind-brain problem as a software-hardware problem? (2) Implications of sleep, dreams and the unconscious as different aspects of the well-known phenomenon of metastable operation. (3) Why would anyone ever need to consider any problem (presumably briefly stated) whose shortest proof uses more symbols than, say, the number of atoms in the universe? The reviewer highly recommends this article to all computer scientists with philosophical interests.
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