Continuum and objectivity. The objective bimodality of the continuum and transcendental Platonism (Q4037522)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 177642
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| English | Continuum and objectivity. The objective bimodality of the continuum and transcendental Platonism |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 177642 |
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18 May 1993
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continuum
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ontology
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transcendental objectivity
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reverse mathematics
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large cardinals
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Platonism
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0.77029949426651
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0.7370544075965881
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0.7316858768463135
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0.7229796648025513
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Continuum and objectivity. The objective bimodality of the continuum and transcendental Platonism (English)
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[For the entire collection see Zbl 0758.00020.] The main philosophical thesis of the paper is that the understanding of the status of the continuum requires a ``good'' theory of what objectivity is. According to the author, a ``good'' theory must be of a ``transcendental'' nature and contrast objectivity not only with mind but also with ontology (in the traditional sense of an independent reality constituted by substantial individuals). After having recalled the basis of transcendental objectivity, the author shows that the Hilbertian symbolic conception of metamathematics can be interpreted in such a way and explains why an ontological (naively Platonistic) conception of the continuum necessarily leads to antinomies. After that he analyzes some conflicting conceptions of the reality of the continuum: (i) the foundational reductions of reverse mathematics (W. Sieg, S. Simpson, S. Feferman) and the controversy between Feferman and Friedman concerning the necessity of a deflationist ontology (Weyl) or inflationist one (Gödel) in set theory; (ii) the introduction of large cardinals for insuring correct regularity properties of the continuum, as, e.g., the determinacy of the Lusin hierarchy of projective sets. The author concludes with a defence of what he calls transcendental (non- ontological) Platonism and shows that Gödel's Platonism can be justified in that way.
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