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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3557728
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3557728 |
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1975
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0.7379248142242432
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0.7379248142242432
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0.7222228646278381
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0.7083479762077332
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[This article was published in the book announced in Zbl 0344.00006.] The paper investigates ``logical grammar'', the grammar that guides the work of most logicians, with an eye on the grammar of the conditional and implication or entailment. The version of logical grammar discussed, a ``categorial grammar'', derives from [\textit{H. B. Curry} and \textit{R. Feys}, Combinatory logic (1958; Zbl 0081.24104)]. The paper begins by explaining the notions of sentence, term, and functor (a function from grammatical entities into grammatical entities), and the four pure elementary functors (operators take terms into terms; predicates take terms into sentences; connectives take sentences into sentences; and subnectors take sentences into terms). Against this background the paper raises the general question of how to parse the fundamental terminology when approaching the task of analyzing a set of concepts. As running examples, the possibilities are laid out for parsing as one of the pure elementary functors each of truth, negation or falsity, conjunction, and the conditional or entailment (construed as a unitary concept). Then the following eight theses are defended. 1. Logical grammar is applicable to English. 2. A concept (or family) can be isolated without specifying its grammar; and accordingly one can ask concerning the advantages and disadvantages of carrying it in various grammatical forms. 3. English permits a given logical concept to be expressed by functors which differ in complexity (e.g. the negation predicate ``\dots is false'' is simpler than the negation connective ``that\dots is false''). 4. (a) Given a logical concept, we can always find a way to carry it in English as any functor we like, provided we are willing to pre-sententialize and pre-nominalize by means of a sufficient number of instances of ``is true'' and ``that''. (b) Often the only or at least the easiest way to carry a concept as a given functor is to pre-sententialize or pre-nominalize by `is true' or `that'. (E.g. we can find an operator for conjunction, ``that\dots is true and\dots is true'', and a connective for implication, ``that\dots implies that\dots''). 5. Sometimes English is indifferent as to grammatical form, in which case the choice of functor with which to carry a concept must be made on extra-grammatical grounds (e.g. English equally accepts a truth-predicate taking sentence-terms, ```Snow is white' is true'', and a truth-predicate taking proposition-terms, ``That snow is white is true''). 6. In contrast to the situation envisaged in 5, sometimes English has fixed ideas about grammatical form: some English constructions definitely and uniformly require terms, and some sentences. But in formulating the theory of a given logical concept, although we should of course be grammatical, it is not required that we slavishly take the details of English grammar as a sure guide to the most fruitful way to proceed (e.g., most logicians choose to carry truth by a predicate and negation-falsity by a connective, even though the concepts have the same English grammar). 7. There are important grammatical constraints on the reading of functors in formal languages into English; but one should be wary of drawing exaggerated metaphysical or conceptual implications from the rules of English grammar. 8. One of the ruhen of each of ``that'' and ``is true'' in English is to serve as a grammatical dodge to evade the constraints of English grammar without semantic penalty. A principal conclusion is that it is legitimate (and inescapable) to ask about the logic of implication or entailment not as a predicate, ``\dots entails\dots'', but as a connective, ``that\dots entails that\dots''.
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