Evaluation and Optimization of Electoral Systems (Q4220552)

In this book the authors analyze electoral systems, principally from the point of view of optimization theory. For the authors, an electoral system is a mechanism by which individual voter preferences are translated into a party-political system of government, usually with some intermediate districting procedure. The first section of the book provides a general formal description of electoral systems and a theoretical typology. Numerous actual electoral systems are then analyzed and placed in this typological framework. Next, the authors study a collection of performance criteria by which electoral systems may be compared. These criteria comprise electoral participation, number of parties, electoral volatility, proportionality, power and coalitions and governmental stability. For each criterion, the authors include brief descriptions and analyses of measures that have been proposed to quantify these different aspects of electoral systems. For example, in the section on power and coalitions, the authors discuss economic winning coalitions, the bargaining proposition, political distance between parties, thresholds, share of spoils, and the Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf, Deegan and Packel, and Holler indexes. These rapid surveys are a valuable primer for each area. In Part II, the authors consider the question of electoral system design. Beginning with an Arrovian impossibility theorem, the authors classify electoral formulas and then apply the techniques of optimization theory to different types of electoral situations, for example party over- or under-representation. In Part III, the authors turn to the tricky and complex issue of designing electoral districts, a topic which has been subject to a certain amount of abuse by politicians. Here the authors attempt to clarify the issues involved and show how to optimize objective criteria. They again include a valuable discussion of different measures, their strengths and weaknesses. Rounding out the book is a chapter viewing the technical and mathematical electoral procedures from a political perspective and a brief summary of pertinent literature. The optimization techniques discussed in the book introduce some fresh ideas and perspectives into the design and evaluation of electoral systems, but not least of this book's virtues is the many rapid summaries of previous work and references to a wide variety of current political systems. Both the novice and expert will be well-rewarded in studying this book.