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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1254484
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    scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1254484

      Statements

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      9 September 1999
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      philosophy of science
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      Occam's razor
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      scientific method
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      beyond necessity
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      ideology
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      ontological commitment
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      fenced ontology
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      ordinary language
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      scientific language
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      Is Occam's razor a rule of the scientific method? This (``tonsorial'') question is elaborated upon with various forms of the razor. As precept about ontology, the razor may be formulated: Entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. As precept about ideology: Causal predicates are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. The paper gives historical glimpses of the tonsorial question. It ends with a reference to ``the arch-Occamite'' Quine concerning his (``final views on'') ontological commitment. Where Quine [\textit{W. V. O. Quine}, Theories and things, Belknap Press (1981), p. 9] suggests that common man's ontology is naturally vague: ``My point is not that ordinary language is slipshod, slipshod though it be. We must recognize this grading off for what it is, and recognize that a fenced ontology is just not implicit in ordinary language. The idea of a boundary between being and nonbeing is a philosophical idea, an idea of technical science in a broad sense. Scientists and philosophers seek a comprehensive system of the world, and one that is oriented to reference even more squarely and utterly than ordinary language. Ontological concern is not a correction of lay thought and practice; it is foreign to the lay culture, though an outgrowth of it.'' The author comments: On reading Quine's grounds, I immediately asked myself, aren't such features every bit as much a part of scientific as of lay or non-scientific prose? Hoping to provoke further discussion, the author suggests an amendment, largely to the effect that Quine's proposal remains plausible if ``ordinary language'' is replaced by ``scientific language''. In other words, that a fenced ontology is not even implicit in scientific language. In contributing to the discussion asked for, the reviewer finds the author's suggested amendment compatible also with a general conception of language. Namely, language as consisting of complementary description and interpretation processes [cf., for example, \textit{L. Löfgen}, ``Nonseparability of inferribility and measurability in quantum mechanics as a systema magnum'', in: R. Trappl (ed.), Proc. EMCSR'98, Vol. 1, 113-118 (1998)]. Here, there is a tension between describability and interpretability -- in any language including natural as well as scientific formal language. Thus, a ``fenced'' ontology, or a well-describable interpretation domain, is impossible if conceived as well-describable in the language itself. Where scientific and natural languages differ, however, is in their aims, or in their choices, concerning the tension (for example, high describability at the cost of low interpretability). This last point also adds to the understanding of ``beyond necessity'' in Occam's razor. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0897.00021].
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