Conceptions and Paradoxes of Setst† (Q4269769)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1360767
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| English | Conceptions and Paradoxes of Setst† |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1360767 |
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Conceptions and Paradoxes of Setst† (English)
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9 May 2000
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concept of set
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ontological status
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realism
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0.713354229927063
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0.6991932392120361
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0.69033282995224
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\textit{W. V. O. Quine} starts a famous paper [``On what there is'', Rev. Metaphysics 2, 21-38 (1948); reprinted in: \textit{W. V. Quine}, From a logical point of view. Logico-philosophical essays (Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass.) (1953; Zbl 0050.00501)] by noticing how simply one can formulate the eternal question of metaphysics using only three Anglo-Saxon monosyllables: `What is there?', and how even more simply one can answer in a word: `Everything'. He then goes on to argue that this simplicity is deceptive, and that there is ample room for disagreement over single cases. The upshot is that our intuitive notion of `what there is' is well worth the long and sustained effort of conceptual clarification and philosophical analysis. In this paper I am going to argue that the situation with the intuitively (and deceptively) simple concept of set is similar in many respects. What sets are there? This question can be interpreted as an external philosophical question concerning the ontological status of the entities of a certain mathematical theory; or it can be interpreted as an internal question, upon which a number of conceptual and mathematical considerations can and must be brought to bear. In attempting to answer the external question we find ourselves entangled in a web of issues related to realism and its philosophical opponents.
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