Characterizations of the Existence of Equilibria in Games with Discontinuous and Non-quasiconcave Payoffs (Q4274433)

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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 482043
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    Characterizations of the Existence of Equilibria in Games with Discontinuous and Non-quasiconcave Payoffs
    scientific article; zbMATH DE number 482043

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      Characterizations of the Existence of Equilibria in Games with Discontinuous and Non-quasiconcave Payoffs (English)
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      6 January 1994
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      aggregator function
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      diagonal transfer quasiconcavity
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      diagonal transfer continuity
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      pure Nash equilibrium
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      dominant strategies
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      oligopoly
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      Classical theorems state that a game has a pure Nash equilibrium if the strategy spaces are compact and convex and the payoff functions are continuous and quasiconcave. Several studies have shown that these assumptions could be relaxed in various ways. The present article extends many of these results. The authors consider a mapping derived from the payoff functions, which they call the aggregator function. They introduce two new conditions: diagonal transfer quasiconcavity and diagonal transfer continuity. These properties apply to the aggregator function and can be viewed as a generalization of standard quasiconcavity and continuity, respectively. Diagonal transfer quasiconcavity is proved to be necessary for the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium. This condition becomes sufficient as well in games where diagonal transfer continuity is satisfied. Diagonal transfer quasiconcavity and diagonal transfer continuity are also used to derive a complete characterization of the existence of pure Nash equilibrium. Let us notice that the underlying necessary and sufficient conditions are not formulated directly in terms of the basic parameters of the game (namely, the strategy spaces and the payoff functions). The authors propose a similar analysis to characterize the existence of Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies. They finally present examples in oligopoly theory which do not satisfy the assumptions of earlier existence theorems but where their results enable them to obtain a solution.
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