No label defined (Q4329282)

From the introdcution: Adaptive logics have several unusual and fascinating properties. Where (monotonic) paraconsistent logics allow for inconsistent theories by not presupposing the consistency of the domain described by the theory, inconsistency-adaptive logics allow for inconsistencies but presuppose the consistency of all sentences `unless and until proven otherwise'. Interpreting a theory `as consistently as possible', they adapt to the specific inconsistencies that occur in it. This paper contains an attempt at an informative but not excessively technical survey of results. Although I list some theorems, I refer to other papers for proofs (and even for some definitions). After a brief characterization of inconsistency-adaptive logics (section 2), I consider some motivations (section 3) and applications (section 4). Then come the semantic basics (section 5), the dynamic proofs (section 6) and the dynamic semantics (section 7). Dimensions along which adaptive logics vary are expounded in sections 8-10, some meta-theoretic results are catalogued in section 11, and the elimination of inconsistencies in view of nonlogical `preferences' is the topic of section 12. In section 13, the perspective is broadened to logics that are adaptive with respect to other abnormalities than inconsistency. Finally, some clusters of open problems are listed in section 14. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0978.00027].