No label defined (Q4336014)

The establishment of a new international economic order emphasizing interdependency among countries after the Second World War led to the establishment of a network of collective decision-making institutions centered around the United Nations. International Economic Organizations (IEO) such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, were to play a decisive role in supporting these exchanges. Through the granting of short-term balance of payment assistance and long-term development loans, these organizations have since then affected the use of both public and private resources. Although there is little doubt that IEOs have in most cases produced valuable results, there is no such consensus that the policy-making process of these organizations has been adequately assessed. The objective of this paper is to provide a game-theoretical framework to help conceptualize the process of policy-making within IEOs. The framework should help explain the influence over IEO outcomes that different parties may, by virtue of structural arrangements, be expected to acquire.