No label defined (Q4348178)

In this comprehensive and well written monograph, the author attempts to scope various complex problems concerning consciousness. In the process, he defends the views that (1) the usual methods of cognitive science and neuroscience are inadequate for settling opinions on the important problems of consciousness, (2) there is no valid reductive explanation of consciousness, (3) some form of dualism is appropriate and (4) consciousness is not adequately explained by any materialist theory. On the other hand, the author proposes no Specialized Turing Test for consciousness. Such specialized testing would provide a touchstone for measurement of progress on settling problems. As a framework for discussions he uses the mythical notion of a zombie (each of which is consciousless) rather than the more conventional approach of Wiener's more dangerous Golem. Crucial use is made of the idea of being ``physically identical''. However, it seems to this reviewer that there is no effective process to decide whether two arbitrary bodies are identical. (Analogy: follow the argument for the recursive unsolvability of the identity problem for finitely presented groups.) The book contains a rich spectrum of interesting topics: the nature of consciousness, the two mind-body problems, cognitive modeling, an argument against materialism, toward a non-reductive theory, coherence as a law, the metaphysics of information, machine consciousness, in defense of strong AI, and interpreting quantum theory. It should be particularly useful to artificial intelligence researchers and the intelligent general reader.