Cooperative theory of bargaining. I: Classical (Q4352252)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1054707
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| English | Cooperative theory of bargaining. I: Classical |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1054707 |
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16 June 1999
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cooperative games
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bargaining
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Nash solution
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egalitarian solution
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0.8631344437599182
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0.8481487035751343
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0.836452305316925
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Cooperative theory of bargaining. I: Classical (English)
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In a classical bargaining problem, several outputs are available for a (fixed) group of participants (called ``agents''); for such problems, game theory tries to help in selecting a reasonable outcome. There exist many possible selections: egalitarian selection, in which every participant gets the same payoff \(u_1=u_2=\ldots\); utilitarian selection in which the sum of the payoffs is the largest possible \(\sum u_i\to\max\); Nash's solution in which \(\prod u_i\to\max\) (and which is uniquely determined by natural invariance requirements), etc. The author formulates different reasonable requirements (axioms) and shows how the choice of different axioms leads to different selection methods. For part II see the review Zbl 0915.90277 below. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0863.00056].
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