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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1118850
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1118850 |
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17 February 1998
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0.8386698365211487
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0.7741908431053162
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The exposition of this important book is best reviewed by the words of the author himself from the introduction: This book begins with a survey of the problem of interpretation, as it arises in the debate between Einstein and Bohr. Einstein's discomfort with quantum mechanics cannot be attributed to an aversion to indeterminism. He did not argue that quantum mechanics must be incomplete because `God does not play dice with the universe.' Rather, as Pauli puts it, Einstein's `philosophical prejudice' was realism, not determinism (section 1.1). Chapter 1 continues with a discussion of the transition from classical to quantum mechanics, and a formulation of the measurement problem as a problem generated by the orthodox (Dirac-von Neumann) interpretation of the theory. My main aim here is to bring out the different ways in which dynamical variables and properties are represented in the two theories. The transition from classical to quantum mechanics involves the transition from a Boolean to a non-Boolean structure for the properties of a system. There are restrictions on what sets of observables can be taken as simultaneously determinate without contradiction, if the attribution of determinate values to observables is required to satisfy certain constraints. The `no go' theorems for hidden variables underlying the quantum statistics provide a series of such results that severely limit the options for a `no collapse' interpretation of the theory. In chapter 2, I present the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (1935) incompleteness argument, and several versions of Bell's extension of the argument to a `no go' theorem demonstrating the inconsistency of stochastic and deterministic hidden variables, satisfying certain locality and separability constraints, with the quantum statistics. Chapter 3 deals with the Kochen and Specker (1967) `no go' theorem, showing the impossibility of assigning determinate values to certain finite sets of observables if the value assignments are required to preserve the functional relations holding among the observables. I present a new proof of the theorem for a set of 33 observables (1-dimensional projectors), based on a classical tautology that is quantum mechanically false proposed by the logician Kurt Schütte in an early (1965) unpublished letter to Specker. Chapter 4 introduces the problem of interpretation, and contains the proof of the uniqueness theorem demonstrating that, subject to certain natural constraints, all `no collapse' interpretations of quantum mechanics can be uniquely characterized and reduced to the choice of a particular preferred observable as determinate. The preferred observable and the quantum state at time \(t\) define a (non-Boolean) `determinate' sublattice in the lattice \(\mathcal L\) of all subspaces of Hilbert space. From the `modal' perspective, the possibility structure of a quantum world is represented by a dynamically evolving (non-Boolean) sublattice in \({\mathcal L}\), while the possibility structure of a classical world is fixed for all time as the Boolean algebra \(\mathcal B\) of subsets of a phase space. Different choices for the preferred determinate observable correspond to different `no collapse' interpretations of quantum mechanics. In chapter 5, I show how the orthodox (Dirac-von Neumann) interpretation without the projection postulate can be recovered from the theorem, and how the measurement problem is avoided in `no collapse' interpretations by an appropriate choice of the preferred determinate observable. The fact that measuring instruments are open systems interacting with environments with many degrees of freedom turns out to have a very different dynamical significance in an observer-free `no collapse' interpretation with a fixed preferred determinate observable. In chapter 6, I show how Bohm's causal interpretation (one natural way to develop an Einsteinian realism within quantum mechanics) and the modal interpretation (in a version generalized from earlier formulations by Kochen, 1985, and by Dieks, 1988, 1989, 1994b) can be seen as two observer-free `no collapse' interpretations in the sense of the theorem. Bohm's interpretation adopts position in configuration space as a fixed preferred determinate observable, while the modal interpretation can be understood as adopting a time-dependent preferred determinate observable derived from the quantum state. I discuss Bohr's complementarity interpretation as a `no collapse' interpretation in chapter 7, and show how this interpretation can be related to the orthodox (Dirac-von Neumann) interpretation from the perspective of the uniqueness theorem. The `new orthodoxy' appears to center now on the idea that the original Copenhagen interpretation has been vindicated by the recent technical results on environmental decoherence. Sophisticated versions of this view are formulated in terms of `consistent histories' or `decoherent histories,' and trade on features of Everett's `relative state' interpretation of quantum mechanics as a solution to the measurement problem (popularly understood as a `many worlds' theory, in some sense). In chapter 8, I argue that there is no real advance here with respect to Einstein's qualms about the Copenhagen interpretation. It is still a `gentle pillow for the true believer,' perhaps now with the added attraction of a rather fancy goose-down comforter. The coda concludes with a review of the main themes of the argument, and its significance for the debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics and the measurement problem. In the appendix, I develop some mathematical machinery dealing with the structure of Hilbert space and the representation of states, probabilities, and observables in quantum mechanics. This book not only expresses the thoughts of the author Jeffrey Bub who is since fourty years successfully working on the title problem, it also comments historical developments as observed from the viewpoint of an expert.
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