THE CATEGORICAL NATURE OF MATHEMATICAL COGNITION (Q4391345)

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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1158246
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    THE CATEGORICAL NATURE OF MATHEMATICAL COGNITION
    scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1158246

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      THE CATEGORICAL NATURE OF MATHEMATICAL COGNITION (English)
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      27 June 1999
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      Maddy
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      Quine
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      neutralism
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      ontology
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      The paper replies to objections to the Quine/Putnam argument for mathematical realism (based on the indispensability of mathematics for natural science) by \textit{P. Maddy}, notably in `Indispensability in practice' [J. Philosophy 89, 275-289 (1992)] and `Naturalism and ontology' [Philos. Math. (3) 3, 248-270 (1995)]. Critical to the replies are the claims that (a) scientists can legitimately be criticised for not accepting the ontology of their theories; and (b) if parts of mathematics do not have (even indirect) empirical applications, they can be looked upon as ``mathematical recreation'', devoid of ontological commitment. It is not clear to the reviewer that the first claim is defensible if one is a naturalist, since it amounts to endorsing the criticism of a scientific attitude on the ground of an a priori philosophical dogma (``to be is to be the value of a bound variable'').
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