THE CATEGORICAL NATURE OF MATHEMATICAL COGNITION (Q4391345)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1158246
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| English | THE CATEGORICAL NATURE OF MATHEMATICAL COGNITION |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1158246 |
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THE CATEGORICAL NATURE OF MATHEMATICAL COGNITION (English)
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27 June 1999
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Maddy
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Quine
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neutralism
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ontology
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0.8596049547195435
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0.8517870903015137
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0.8345929384231567
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0.8237102627754211
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The paper replies to objections to the Quine/Putnam argument for mathematical realism (based on the indispensability of mathematics for natural science) by \textit{P. Maddy}, notably in `Indispensability in practice' [J. Philosophy 89, 275-289 (1992)] and `Naturalism and ontology' [Philos. Math. (3) 3, 248-270 (1995)]. Critical to the replies are the claims that (a) scientists can legitimately be criticised for not accepting the ontology of their theories; and (b) if parts of mathematics do not have (even indirect) empirical applications, they can be looked upon as ``mathematical recreation'', devoid of ontological commitment. It is not clear to the reviewer that the first claim is defensible if one is a naturalist, since it amounts to endorsing the criticism of a scientific attitude on the ground of an a priori philosophical dogma (``to be is to be the value of a bound variable'').
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