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This collection of fifteen essays is intended as a companion to the philosophy of Bertrand Russell aiming at providing a reference work for students and non-specialists. It is exclusively concerned with Russell's contributions to philosophy. The useful introduction (pp.\ 1--50), provided by the editor, gives in a first part a survey on Russell's life. The second part on his philosophy tries to link together its different branches and versions, no doubt a challenge of a special kind, because Russell ``changed his position, even on fundamental matters, several times over a long career, prompting his former student, C.\ D. Broad, to remark that he produced a new system of philosophy every few years'' (p.\ 18). The volume contains the following essays: \textit{I.\ Grattan-Guinness}, ``Mathematics in and behind Russell's logicism'' (pp. 51--83), discussing Russell's early work in logic in the context of his interest for the philosophy of mathematics, including its prehistory in mathematical analysis, and its reception; \textit{N.\ Griffin}, ``Russell's philosophical background'' (pp. 84--107), dealing with Russell's neo-Hegelian roots and their influence on his later philosophy, e.g., on investigation of paradoxes; \textit{R.\ L.\ Cartwright}, ``Russell and Moore, 1898--1905'' (pp. 108--127) on the relation between Russell and his colleague at Trinity College Cambridge, G.\ E.\ Moore, dealing with their role in establishing a `new philosophy'; \textit{M.\ Beaney}, ``Russell and Frege'' (pp. 128--170), giving a comparison of their philosophies of logic, pointing also to differing conceptions and practises in analysis; \textit{M.\ Godwyn and A.\ D.\ Irvine}, ``Bertrand Russell's logicism'' (pp. 171--201) on Russell's version of logicism, according to which the logicist's goal is ``to show that all pure mathematics follows from purely logical premises and uses only concepts definable in logical terms'' (quote according to p.\ 171); \textit{P. Hylton}, ``The theory of description'' (pp. 202--240); \textit{G.\ Landini}, ``Russell's substitutional theory'' (pp. 241--285) in the context of Russell's type-theoretical attempts to overcome the paradoxes; \textit{A.\ Urquhart}, ``The theory of types'' (pp. 286--309), discussing early type-theoretical conceptions, the ramified theory of types, the axiom of reducibility, and the simple theory of types; \textit{P.\ Hager}, ``Russell's method of analysis'' (pp. 310--331) on the two parts of `philosophical analysis' with a first stage proceeding backwards from a body of knowledge to its premises (`analysis') and a second stage proceeding forwards from the premisses to a reconstruction of the original body of knowledge (`synthesis', `construction'). Russell's widely ignored later writings are also considered: \textit{R.\ E.\ Tully}, ``Russell's neutral monism'' (pp. 332--370), a central constituent of Russell's metaphysics in the period between 1914 and 1927; \textit{B.\ Linsky}, ``The metaphysics of logical atomism'' (pp. 371--391), a combination of metaphysical and logical doctrines which Russell held in the period from around 1910 to at least 1925; \textit{W.\ Demopoulos}, ``Russell's structuralism and the absolute description of the world'' (pp. 392--419) on Russell's concept of structure as being fully articulated in his ``The analysis of matter'' [London: Kegan, Trench, Trübner \& Co. (1927; JFM 53.0052.05)] and subsequent papers; \textit{T.\ Baldwin}, ``From knowledge by acquaintance to knowledge by causation'' (pp. 420--448) on central epistemological views of Russell's; \textit{A.\ C.\ Grayling}, ``Russell, experience, and the roots of science'' (pp. 449--474), giving evidence for the claim that Russell was an empiricist; \textit{C.\ S.\ Pigden}, ``Bertrand Russell: moral philosopher or unphilosophical moralist?'' (pp. 475--506), distinguishing six phases of Russell's ethical theory. A selective bibliography (pp. 507--540) and an index (pp. 541--550) complete the volume.