Mathematics and Bleak House (Q4470294)

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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2076874
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    Mathematics and Bleak House
    scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2076874

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      Mathematics and Bleak House (English)
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      22 June 2004
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      realism
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      nominalism
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      fictionalism
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      The author reconsiders the opposition of nominalism and realism in mathematics by regarding nominalism as fictionalism and realism as anti-fictionalism, collecting pros and cons for this interpretation. If mathematics is regarded as fictionalist, it is most similar to fables, as the author suggests after having browsed literary genres. The most important feature, however, common to all genres of fiction is that mathematics is a body of falsehoods. He exemplifies this with existence theorems in mathematics which are supposed to be untrue. They say, e.g., that there exist prime numbers greater than \({10^{10}}^{10}\), whereas according to nominalists there are no such things as numbers at all (pp.\ 22--23). Sect 3 is devoted to the fictionalist's not taking mathematical propositions literally. The author admits, however, ``the comparative lack of evidence for attributing a \textit{global} `non-literalist' intention to mathematicians \textit{generally}'' (p.\ 27), takes, on the other hand, contrasting cases into account: specific mathematicians like Brouwer and Hilbert, and local uses and idioms (sect 4). One of the effects of this discussion is a refutation of hermeneutical fictionalism according to which ``mathematical theorems are true, but while what mathematical theorems appear to mean implies the existence of mathematical entities, what they really mean does not'' (p.\ 23). Gödel's theorems show furthermore that the variation of the revolutionary fictionalism (its reconstructions of mathematics are not analyses of current mathematics, but amendments of it, p.\ 23) could be a better choice because undecidability and incompleteness give no support to hermeneutics (sect 5). The author remains, however, sceptical in regarding mathematical fictionalism an `error theory' offering a `correction' to mathematics (p.\ 30). He presents (sect 5) a controversial debate on R.\ Carnap's view that the question of the existence of numbers has only raised by philosophers, not mathematicians, a debate that ``goes on and on and on without ever being settled'' (p.\ 31). In sum, the author comes to the conclusion that the slogan `mathematics is a fiction' is not very appropriate, and the comparison of mathematics to fiction is not very apt (p.\ 35).
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