On optimal missile guidance upgrades with dynamic Stackelberg game linearizations (Q4530577)

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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1748685
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    On optimal missile guidance upgrades with dynamic Stackelberg game linearizations
    scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1748685

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      29 June 2003
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      dynamic games
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      pursuit and evasion
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      On optimal missile guidance upgrades with dynamic Stackelberg game linearizations (English)
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      The authors investigate the most critical final homing phase for one intercepting missile versus one maneuverable ballistic missile. The pursuit-evasion dynamics is described by the equation \({d\over dt} z=f(z,u_\varepsilon, u_p)\), \(z(t_0)= z_0\), for \(t\in [t_0,\infty]\), where \(z\) is the state vector, and \(u_E,u_P\)-control vectors. An optimal small guidance upgrade for an intercepting missile is calculated as a closed-loop solution of a dynamic Stackelberg game. The intercepting missile acts as leader, whereas the ballistic missile advantageously acts as follower. The trajectories are computed efficiently by a direct collocation method. Along the trajectories a linearized minimum-maximum principle using the adjoint variables' estimates is applied. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0982.00053].
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