The Value of Public Information in Monopoly (Q4531048)
From MaRDI portal
!
This is the item page for this Wikibase entity, intended for internal use and editing purposes. Please use the normal view instead:
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1746863
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| default for all languages | No label defined |
||
| English | The Value of Public Information in Monopoly |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1746863 |
Statements
The Value of Public Information in Monopoly (English)
0 references
28 May 2002
0 references
0.94185984
0 references
0.85402334
0 references
0.81458116
0 references
0.81248003
0 references
0.8105933
0 references
0.80895674
0 references
0.80647904
0 references
0 references
0 references
0.79100376
0 references
In the standard pricing monopoly problem, a monopolist offers a price-quantity menu to a single privately informed buyer. A question arising is whether a policy of revealing an additional public signal about the good is beneficial to the seller. The authors show that the expected profit of the monopolist cannot decrease by committing to reveal a signal affiliated to the buyer's private signal.
0 references
