Endogenous managerial incentives and the optimal combination of debt and dividend commitments (Q4547085)

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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1785697
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    Endogenous managerial incentives and the optimal combination of debt and dividend commitments
    scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1785697

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      Endogenous Managerial Incentives and the Optimal Combination of Debt and Dividend Commitments (English)
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      Endogenous managerial incentives and the optimal combination of debt and dividend commitments (English)
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      21 August 2002
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      Managerial Information Advantages
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      Endogenous Objective Functions,Financial Commit-ments
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      Agency Costs
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      Dividend Puzzle
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      This paper studies the optimal combination of debt and dividend commitments in an agency model of the firm. Financial policy is relevant because ex-post information asymmetry requires managerial rewards to depend on the ability to meet financial commitments. If perquisite or inside information problems exist in isolation, debt-based incentives as assumed in previous studies result endogenously. If the problems exist simultaneously, dividends can be optimal even when they appear excessively costly as a signal and unduly lenient as a disciplining device. The reason is that the set of dynamically consistent rewards increases when debt commitments are augmented with dividend commitments, and a larger set of ex-post rewards is more valuable as ex-ante decisions become more complex.
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