No label defined (Q4661968)

Foreword: The aims of this paper are (i) to summarize the semantics of (the propositional part of) a unified epistemic/doxastic logic as it has been developed previously at greater length [the author, Glauben, Wissen und Wahrscheinlichkeit. Systeme der epistemischen Logik. Wien: Springer (1980; Zbl 0466.03001)] and (ii) to use some of these principles for the development of a semi-formal pragmatics of epistemic sentences. While a semantic investigation of epistemic attitudes has to elaborate the truth-conditions for, and the analytically true relations between, the fundamental notions of belief, knowledge, and conviction, a pragmatic investigation instead has to analyse the specific conditions of rational utterance or utterability of epistemic sentences. Some people might think that both tasks coincide. According to Wittgenstein, e.g., the meaning of a word or a phrase is nothing else but its use (say, within a certain community of speakers). Therefore the pragmatic conditions of utterance of words or sentences are assumed to determine the meaning of the corresponding expressions. One point I wish to make here, however, is that one may elaborate the meaning of epistemic expressions in a way that is largely independent of -- and, indeed, even partly incompatible with -- the pragmatic conditions of utterability. Furthermore, the crucial differences between the pragmatics and the semantics of epistemic expressions can satisfactorily be explained by means of some general principles of communication. In the first three sections of this paper the logic (or semantics) of the epistemic attitudes \textit{belief}, \textit{knowledge}, and \textit{conviction} will be sketched. In the fourth section the basic idea of a general pragmatics will be developed which can then be applied to epistemic utterances in particular. For the entire collection see [Zbl 1050.03001].