Strategic Pricing, Consumer Search and the Number of Firms (Q4663340)
From MaRDI portal
!
This is the item page for this Wikibase entity, intended for internal use and editing purposes. Please use the normal view instead:
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2150726
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| default for all languages | No label defined |
||
| English | Strategic Pricing, Consumer Search and the Number of Firms |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2150726 |
Statements
Strategic Pricing, Consumer Search and the Number of Firms (English)
0 references
30 March 2005
0 references
strategic pricing
0 references
oligopoly model
0 references
consumer search intensity
0 references
equilibrium expected price
0 references
number of market competitors
0 references
0.7882612347602844
0 references
0.7506184577941895
0 references
0.7480415105819702
0 references
0.7459823489189148
0 references
0.7430468201637268
0 references
This paper presents a detailed analysis of an oligopoly model with consumer search, where the equilibrium expected price may be constant, increasing or non-monotonic in the number of firms. In this economy model, a certain function of consumers engages in costly non-sequential search to discover prices, three distinct price-dispersed equilibria being characterized in terms of how intensively consumers search: low, moderate, and high search intensity equilibria. The authors prove the following main results for the considered economy model and restrictions: (1) If the economy is in a low search intensity equilibrium, an increase on the number of competitors does not influence expected price, and results in a greater price dispersion and in a decrease in welfare. (2) In a moderate search intensity equilibrium, the effect of bringing more competitors together is an unambiguous increase in expected price, but this type of equilibrium fails to exist when the number \(N\) of firms become large. (3) When the consumers search with high intensity, entry of a new firm leads to a lower expected price when the number of competitors in the market is small to begin with, but to a higher expected price otherwise. Thus in this case, the expected price exhibits a non-monotonic relationship with respect to the number \(N\) of firms. (4) Another result consists in showing how consumers' search behaviour prevents firms form charging monopoly prices, even when the market accommodates a very large number of competitors. For instance, when the economy is initially in a moderate search intensity equilibrium, the intuition behind the above announced procedure is that, as the number of firms grows over a critical number, less-informed consumers find it profitable to economize on search and start exiting the market with positive probability, which also prevents monopoly pricing. This result is in contrast with previous research because it shows that when all price quotations are costly to be obtained, price dispersion does not vanish as the number of firms approaches infinity. (5) A result that is worth to be stressed is that in high search intensity equilibrium, two forms and infinitely many firms yield the same market outcome, while three or more firms realize typically lower expected prices. This effect is also at odds with previous research, highlighting the strong influence of consumer search on the pricing behaviour of firms. (6) Finally, the authors show that there are sets of parameters for which multiple equilibria emerge. A high search intensity equilibrium may coexist with a low or with a moderate search intensity equilibrium, but the latter two types of equilibria will never coexist together. For the same parameter values, expected prices are lower in the high search intensity equilibrium than in the other types of equilibria. This multiplicity of equilibria can potentially explain price differences across seemingly identical markets. Moreover, it suggests that consumers would gain if they did collectively agree to search with high intensity. However, consumers acting unilaterally would not have an incentive to engage in more search when firms expect them not to search much and choose their prices accordingly.
0 references