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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2154303
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2154303 |
Statements
8 April 2005
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many worlds
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Everett
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expectation values
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measurement
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0.8548271059989929
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0.8362886309623718
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0.8318764567375183
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0.816714882850647
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0.8028969168663025
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John Wheeler was Hugh Everett's thesis advisor and supporter. In this tribute to Wheeler, de Witt's stated purpose is ``to expand on Everett's original demonstration and to reveal the courage John Wheeler displayed in betting he was right'' (p. 167). In fact it combines somewhat technical, reasoned aspects of quantum formalism, with spirited but far less reasoned claims about its meaning. The tone is set at the outset: ``Everett's aim was to cut through the fuzzy thinking displayed by many authors\dots who in previous years had written incredibly dull papers on how they understood quantum mechanics. Everett's idea was simply to assume that quantum mechanics provides a description of reality in exactly the same sense as classical mechanics was thought to do.'' Yet the very next sentence betrays that all is not so simple: ``This is a shocking idea, for it leads to a multiplicity of `realities'\,'' (ibid). The discussion starts with a section ``Classical Theory of Measurement''. Measurement is formalised in terms of a coupled system and measuring apparatus, with increasing refinements including apparatus inertia, uncertainties and insertion of a ``compensation term''. The next section ``Quantum Theory of Measurement'' is longer and addresses state vector spaces, observable operators, basis sets, `relative states' or superpositions, ending with an interpretive discussion ``Many worlds''. A section ``Probabilities'' follows, starting with some brief metaphysical claims, then describing various formal aspects of quantum probabilities including expectation values, ensembles, joint and conditional probabilities. Finally the section ``Emergence from classical worlds'' gives a technical account of ``the decoherence produced in high-inertia systems through coupling to low inertia systems'' (p. 188), intended to answer ``another important question that Everett left dangling: Why can one assume the ready availability of the narrow variances\dots that allow one to perform accurate measurements in the first place?'' (ibid). The paper ends with a brief review of ``Problems for the future''. Most of the paper is thus a reasoned account of physics and its formalism. When the topic moves to interpretation however the discussion is much less reasoned. For example in ``Many worlds'' Wheeler is quoted first, likening `relative states' to the conceptual advances of Newton, Maxwell and Einstein (p. 176). Everett is then cited, comparing those who object that they do not sense the ``splitting'' of worlds to ``anti-Copernicans in the time of Galileo, who did not feel the earth move'' (ibid). Next de Witt enters the fray. Having argued that ``the laws of quantum mechanics do not allow us to feel ourselves split'' (ibid) he dismisses objections based on Occam's Razor: ``A consistent application of this logic would require one to deny the existence of planets of distant galaxies. One should remember that in the nineteenth century many physicists denied the existence of atoms'' (p. 177). Finally a paragraph later we are close to absurdity: ``The Everett interpretation does satisfy Occam's principle in the sense that it keeps concepts to a minimum, taking the mathematical formalism as it stands without adding excess metaphysical baggage in the form of ``collapsing wave functions'' or probabilities imposed from outside'' (ibid, the author's stress). The argument is that these multiple realities -- created after measurement and unavailable to us ``who live in only one of these worlds'' (p. 178) -- this explosion of real worlds is required to save us from ``excess metaphysical baggage''! There are interesting historical notes in the paper, for example attributing some of Everett's terminology to Wheeler. And many physicists might enjoy the polemic. But at the outset de Witt notes ``few physicists in 1957 were prepared to accept'' Everett's many worlds (p. 167). It would be interesting to know if there are more adherents today. This paper is unlikely to increase their number. For the entire collection see [Zbl 1053.81004].
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