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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1370351
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    scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1370351

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      2 August 2000
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      generalized convex spaces
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      equilibrium
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      One of the main ideas of game theory is the idea of a randomized strategy: when we have \(n\) possible alternatives (``pure strategies'') \(A_1,\dots,A_n\), then, in addition to selecting one of them, we can also pick probabilities \(p_1,\dots,p_n\), \(\sum p_i=1\), and select \(A_i\) with probability \(p_i\). From the mathematical viewpoint, all possible strategies can thus be viewed as probability measures on the set of all possible pure strategies, and a composite strategy in which \(s_i\) is selected with probability \(p_i\) is a convex combination \(p_1\cdot s_1+\cdots+p_n\cdot s_n\) of the strategies \(s_i\). The set of all possible strategies (convex combinations of alternatives) can be viewed as a convex subset of a linear space -- namely, of the space of all possible linear combinations of alternatives. In view of this representation, most existence theorems in game theory are proven for the case when the set of all strategies is a ``convex space'', i.e., a convex subset of a linear space. The authors show that some of these results hold in more general situations, when we have a way to combine pure strategies which is not necessarily equivalent to randomization: e.g., we can use quantum combinations which are known not to be exactly equivalent to probabilistic ones, or, more realistically, consider strategies ``intermediate'' between the original ones. For such situations, weaker conditions called ``generalized convexity'' are sufficient to guarantee the existence of a game equilibrium. In the process of proving interesting game-theoretic results, the authors prove interesting and promising generalizations of fixed point theorems and other similar results to generalized convex spaces.
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