The inner world of mathematics (Q4718796)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1382775
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| English | The inner world of mathematics |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1382775 |
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4 January 2000
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sociology of mathematics
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sociology of knowledge
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quasi-empiricism
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mathematical epistemology
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proof
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truth
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mathematical experiment
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evidence
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mathematical community
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control
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acceptance
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foundational crisis
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The inner world of mathematics (English)
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This book contributes to the sociology of mathematics, but it goes far beyond a narrow sociological scope. The author takes questions of the philosophy of mathematics into account, and correlates her topic to insights derived from the history of mathematics. Her book is a masterpiece of an interdisciplinary science of science. The author follows the methodological framework of the sociology of scientific knowledge. This ``constructive sociology of science'' is justified by the thesis of an underdeterminacy in principle of theories by data. She criticizes, however, important directions in this branch of sociology such as \textit{David Bloor}'s transfer of the ``strong programme of the sociology of knowlege'' to mathematics and \textit{Eric Livingston}'s investigations on the practice of doing mathematics using ethnomethodological tools. According to Bloor, e.g., a sociological account of mathematical knowledge is only possible if a kind of mathematics were conceivable alternative to the present one [\textit{D. Bloor}, Knowledge and social imagery, Routledge \& Kegan Paul, London; 2nd ed. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, p. 179 (1976, \(^21991\))]. Against these positions the author gives the advice to take notice of the universality of mathematics and look for the mechanisms responsible for this universality (p. 27). The author begins with a useful survey of current directions in the philosophy of mathematics, considering their development and their relations to conceptions in the philosophy of science (ch. 2). She discusses the standard problems of mathematical ontology and epistemology, the problems of justifying mathematical beliefs and actual challenges of mathematical proof, especially by the claim that mathematics is a quasi-empirical science. In chapter 3 the author discusses conceptions and questions of a constructive sociology of science, tracing its roots back to the sociology of science of the neopositivist \textit{Otto Neurath}. In chapters 4 to 6 she presents empirical material based on her interviews with mathematical researchers working at the German Max Planck Institute for Mathematics in Bonn. Her questions focused on the conditions of mathematical creativity. How does a mathematician find his ideas? How could the process of discovery be described? What is the portion of unconscious processes, and how can they be influenced? (p. 143). Among the examples often mentioned are the proofs of Fermat's conjecture and the four colour theorem. Topics in these statements are the mathematical experiment and the discovery of proofs (ch. 4), ``the context of persuasion'', i.e., the conditions for accepting a mathematical theorem, and the role of the mathematical community in constituting the body of mathematics accepted (ch. 5), and the tensions between the opinion that mathematical knowledge is a paradigm for rigorous knowledge and the challenges of some branches of quasi-empiricism which veil the differences between truth and holding for true. The author reconstructs the proof as a medium of communication (ch. 6). In the last chapter she draws the moral. She shows that the conviction that mathematical knowledge is widely universal and cumulative does not necessarily exclude sociological explanations (p. 272). She sees the legitimation of a sociology of mathematics in the reconstruction of the development that led to the epistemic structure typical for modern mathematics, with its coherence and rationality in argumentation. Sociology helps to understand the process and to explain its reasons. This book merits notice of a wide audience. It might even give orientation to mathematicians reflecting on what is going on when they do mathematics.
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