Bargaining with Two-sided Incomplete Information: An Infinite Horizon Model with Alternating Offers (Q4724441)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3997576
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| English | Bargaining with Two-sided Incomplete Information: An Infinite Horizon Model with Alternating Offers |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3997576 |
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Bargaining with Two-sided Incomplete Information: An Infinite Horizon Model with Alternating Offers (English)
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1987
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infinite-horizon bargaining model
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two-sided incomplete information
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trade
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Nash equilibrium
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sequential equilibrium
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soft player
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0.8941309452056885
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0.866657555103302
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0.8418583869934082
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0.8187551498413086
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0.8178555369377136
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This paper constructs an infinite-horizon bargaining model which incorporates the following properties: (1) there is two-sided incomplete information, (2) there is no restriction on the duration of the game, and (3) the size of potential gains from bargaining is uncertain. The paper considers a market in which a seller bargains with a buyer. Each agent can play the strategy, in pure or mixed form, of being hard of being soft. It is assumed that each agent does not know which type the other player is. Both agents form beliefs about the type of the other player via Bayes' rule. The bargaining proceeds in stages. At each stage, the seller first makes an offer and the buyer responds with a counter offer. If these offers are acceptable to both parties, trade occurs and the game stops. If not, no trade occurs and the process begins again with a discount. The paper shows that except for a set of games of measure zero, a unique Nash equilibrium exists, which is also a sequential equilibrium but is a pure-strategy equilibrium only if one player concedes the game immediately. In this model, the soft player will never play tough in any period, and will not continue in the game indefinitely. Finally, the likelihood that an agent will capture the gains from trade increases if there is an increase in his relative bargaining power.
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