Dynamic Behaviour in Large Markets for Differentiated Products (Q4726016)

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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3999621
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    Dynamic Behaviour in Large Markets for Differentiated Products
    scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3999621

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      Dynamic Behaviour in Large Markets for Differentiated Products (English)
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      1987
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      dynamic Nash equilibria
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      sequence of markets
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      continuum of consumers
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      competitive equilibrium
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      A continuum of consumers and N firms (indexed by i) inhabit a circle with circumference Z for a countably infinite number of periods. Consumers are uniformly distributed on the circle, whereas the firms are located symmetrically on it. A market is defined as \(M_ N=(N,C,f,Z,\beta,s)\), where C is the common cost function of firms, f the demand function of consumers (the demand function of an individual consumer being f(\(\min_{i}(P_ i+\lambda x_ i))\) where \(P_ i\) is the price chosen by firm i and \(x_ i\) the minimum arc length distance between the consumer and firm i), \(\beta\) is a positive discounting factor in the economy and s a non-negative system parameter which occurs in the specification of the demand on firm i:\(\int N^ sf(P_ i+\lambda \phi)d\phi\) (the integral being taken over the circle section described by firm i). The results of the paper - stated in three theorems - are that under certain conditions (a) the sequence \((M_ N)_ N\) of markets converges to a competitive equilibrium as N tends to infinity, provided \(s=1\), and that (b) only if \(s\neq 1\) and time limit marginal costs exceed the limiting static Nash price does \((M_ N)_ N\) not converge to competitive equilibrium.
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