No label defined (Q4783587)

In this paper the authors consider \(n\) player games with multiple noncommensurable criteria and use the notion of a Pareto-Nash equilibrium. The strategy set of player \(i\) is taken to be a nonempty compact convex subset of a normed linear space \(E_i.\) The solution concept is also refined in a manner similar to the notion of stable set of Nash equilibria introduced by Kohlberg and Mertens. Such a stable set is called an essential component of the solution set in this paper. It is shown that under the assumptions that the payoff functions satisfy certain continuity and convexity conditions, every multiobjective generalized game has at least one essential component of its weakly Pareto-Nash equilibria. See also \textit{H. Yang} and \textit{J. Yu} [Appl. Math. Lett. 15, 553--560 (2002; Zbl 1016.91008)]. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0996.00055].