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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1908232
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1908232 |
Statements
2002
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classical power values
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voting games
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characteristic function
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0.8130481243133545
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0.8056167364120483
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0.7868366241455078
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Power values such as those defined by Shapley or Banzhaf are based on the assumption that all coalitions are equally likely. In this paper the authors point out that in many voting games this may not be true and given a specific problem, the model can often assign a probability p for a coalition S to materialize. This paper uses such probabilities to define extended power values. Coalition formation is interpreted as a bargaining process in which the players seek to maximize their individual power values by way of a cooperative optimization. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0990.00073].
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