The Syllogism's Final Solution (Q4946840)

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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1422977
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    The Syllogism's Final Solution
    scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1422977

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      The Syllogism's Final Solution (English)
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      25 June 2001
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      women logicians
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      Aristotelian syllogistic
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      Ladd-Franklin
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      validity test
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      truth
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      One of the puzzles posed by Aristotelian syllogistic is how can we give a general test to determine a syllogism's validity or invalidity? Aristotle is clear that in a valid syllogism the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. He demonstrates validity in two ways: he `converts' second and third figure syllogisms back to his axiomatic first figure syllogisms, and he constructs reductio proofs. Aristotle demonstrates a syllogism's invalidity `through terms' -- i.e., by constructing a counter-example. But Aristotle does not offer an account of what all valid syllogisms have in common. Christine Ladd-Franklin provides a general method. She devises a method for reducing syllogisms to a normal form that allows a simple inspection test do determine validity. The basic relation in Ladd-Franklin's system is exclusion \((\overline\lor)\): \(a\overline\lor b\) means `no \(a\) is \(b\)' when \(a\) and \(b\) are Aristotelian terms; \(a\overline\lor b\) means `\(a\) and \(b\) are inconsistent' when \(a\) and \(b\) are propositions. The triad composed of the two premises and the negation of the conclusion of a syllogism conforms to the following formula: \[ (a\overline\lor b) (c\overline\lor\sim b)(ac\vee) \overline\lor\tag{II} \] That is, the three members of the triad \{(no \(a\) is \(b)\), (all \(c\) are \(b)\), (some \(a\) is \(c)\}\) are inconsistent. Any two members jointly entail the negation of the third. The terms \(a,b\), and \(c\), can be complex or simple in Ladd-Franklin's system. Aristotelian terms are simple, and so any valid syllogism can be reduced to the normal form (II) by negating the conclusion and expressing the universal propositions in terms of exclusion \((\overline\lor)\), and particulars in terms of inclusion \((\vee)\). The validity test is then simple: TEST: If two of the propositions are universal and the other particular, and if that term only which is common to the two universal propositions has unlike signs, then and only then, the syllogism is valid. This is perhaps intuitively clear, but, as Russinoff points out, Ladd-Franklin, writing in the late 19th century, did not have the logical tools to demonstrate formally that every inconsistent triad has the Ladd-Franklin form. Russinoff's Final Solution is a proof of Ladd-Franklin's Rule of Syllogism. Russinoff explains that the necessary logical tool is the notion of truth at an interpretation, a notion not developed until the 20th century, and so not available to Ladd-Franklin. The proof is straightforward, but it is not trivial. When an interpretation can be given that makes each member of a triad true, then the triad is consistent, and the original syllogism invalid. When no possible interpretation can make each memher of a triad true, then the triad is inconsistent, and the syllogism is valid. Russinoff requires interpretations with varying domains of discourse -- sometimes a triad's consistency can be proven in a universe containing only one member, other times consistency requires more than one member. The remainder of the article provides a short survey of the history of syllogistic logic, noting especially the differences between Ladd-Franklin's construal and others. One suggestion that Russinoff mentions but does not develop is that Ladd-Franklin's language is sometimes suggestive of the contemporary notion of interpretation.
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