No label defined (Q4955428)

Logics of knowledge and belief are often closed under the congruence principle: when \(\varphi\leftrightarrow\psi\) is a thesis, so is \(B \varphi\leftrightarrow B\psi\). With \(B\) read as `believes that', this commits the agent to a form of logical omniscience, which is regarded as inappropriate for certain applications. One might want to consider systems in which such omniscience holds only when the formulae \(\varphi,\psi\) are sufficiently simple and similar so that the agent may reasonably be expected to be able to perceive their equivalence in the system. The authors model this idea in an abstract way in a possible-worlds semantics using neighbourhood. Each world has not one neighbourhood, but a whole family of them, indexed by formulae. Each frame is equipped with an equivalence relation between formulae, not defined but subject to possible constraints, with equivalent formulae determining the same neighbourhoods at any given world. To allow congruence but not monotony, a variant construction is used. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0931.00027].