Toward predicate approaches to modality (Q495650)

Standard modal logic treats modalities, resp. necessity, but also knowledge, belief, obligation, amongst others, as operators, applied to statements, or propositions, to return statements. They are thus analogous to negation. Syntactical or predicate approaches, by contrast, formalize modalities as predicates, applied to terms, e.g., names of statements, to return statements. They are thus more analogous to truth as that is usually construed. Since at least \textit{R. Montague} [Acta Philos. Fenn. 16, 153--167 (1963; Zbl 0117.01302)], the predicate approach has generally been considered paradoxical and the operator approach the only way to understand modality. This book argues to the contrary and promotes predicate approaches. The argument is two-fold. First, it is argued that with regard to paradox, truth and modality are quite on a par. If Montague's theorem undermines predicate approaches to modality, then Tarski's theorem should equally undermine predicate approaches to truth. Yet, no one thinks it does. Second, it is argued that if operator-based modal logics are appropriately expressive as predicate languages are, then they too are subject to corresponding paradox. Hence, there is no particular advantage to the operator approach, vis-à-vis paradox. Those arguments comprise Chapter 1 and especially Chapter 2 of the book. As with much modern study of truth, the author regards paradox not so much something to be feared and shunned, as to be analyzed and understood. Chapter 3 investigates in detail how basic modal principles combine to produce inconsistency. This includes examining how the interaction of multiple modalities might provide a more refined characterization of modal notions, but with cautions. Chapter 4 presents a positive theory of necessity as a predicate, actually two distinct theories. In addition to the predicate for necessity, both contain a truth predicate, which bears the burden of paradox, and its resolution. The first theory extends the axiomatic theory of truth of \textit{H. Friedman} and \textit{M. Sheard} [Ann. Pure Appl. Logic 33, 1--21 (1987; Zbl 0634.03058)], apt for a revision theory of truth; the second extends the axiomatic theory of \textit{S. Feferman} for Kripke's fixet point theory [J. Symb. Log. 56, No. 1, 1--49 (1991; Zbl 0746.03046)]. The key to both is to allow the introduction or elimination of the necessity predicate only with a detour through the truth predicate. Both theories preserve theorem-hood with respect to operator-based modal logics, and both meet adequacy conditions relative to their respective semantic theories of truth. Chapter 5 is a very brief summary/conclusion. The book combines, and extends, material from the author's previously published papers. The heart of Chapter 2 is from ``Montague's theorem and modal logic'' [Philos. Math. (3) 21, No. 2, 180--199 (2013; Zbl 1304.03003)]. Chapter 3 draws on ``Paradoxes of interaction'' with [\textit{M. Fischer}, J. Philos. Log. 44, No. 3, 287--308 (2015; Zbl 1326.03029)]. Chapter 4 extends the two papers [the author, Rev. Symb. Log. 7, No. 2, 273--298 (2014; Zbl 1345.03043); ibid. 7, No. 2, 299--318 (2014; Zbl 1345.03044)]. This is an interesting study. It reminds one that even when results are rigorously established, like Montague's theorem, issues are complex and there may be much more to say. The arguments presented here are clear and cogent, the demonstrations formally detailed and precise. Unfortunately, the book is marred by very many misprints. Most are small and merely annoying; some interfere with comprehension.