Prior and possibly not existing (Q516421)

In classical quantificational logic, every individual constant is interpreted as denoting a value from the domain of discourse so that every instance of \(\exists x(x = a)\) is valid and thus a theorem of a complete logic. Standard tense and modal logics claim -- using rule of necessitation -- that therefore every theorem is always and necessarily true. From this result, one frequently infers that everything always and necessarily exists. This consequence is not very intuitive and Prior tried to avoid this result. Prior's tense and modal logics did avoid it due to rejecting the rule of necessitation. The author of the paper shows that Prior's solution is not fully satisfactory and, saving some important features of Prior's approach, builds up his own classical contingentist modal logic. In this system, positive features of Prior (as not using free logic, not substitutionalist quantification, a restricted necessitation rule) are saved and the Barcan formula is proved not to be generally valid. The author rightly recognizes that his results are dependent on actualism and on the definition of the domain of discourse, where in the author's opinion various interpretations can be admitted. The differing assumptions are very interesting: choosing just one domain of bare individuals we cannot prove that everything necessarily exists and the Barcan formula provably holds. Individual constants in such a system denote individual intensions rather than members of the domain.