Private value allocations in large economies with differential information (Q5931927)

The main result of this paper is in some sense (weaker assumptions, other proof methods are necessary) an equivalence theorem of Aumann's type: Under assumptions , the set of all private value allocations in the economy E coincides with the set of competitive allocations. E belongs to an (exactly defined) class of exchange economies. The point of the proof of the equivalence is, to derive from E a nonatomic coalitional game (the market game) and to use its properties, especially the core, and then saddle point theorems, since a Slater condition can be shown to be fullfilled. As a closing remark it is said, that the assumptions for the utility functions of the traders can be weakened: there is a version of the equivalence theorem, where the utility functions are strictly increasing not on the entire commodity space but in its interior and vanish on its boundary.