Cooperation and computability in \(n\)-player games (Q5946255)
From MaRDI portal
!
This is the item page for this Wikibase entity, intended for internal use and editing purposes. Please use the normal view instead:
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1658571
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| default for all languages | No label defined |
||
| English | Cooperation and computability in \(n\)-player games |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1658571 |
Statements
Cooperation and computability in \(n\)-player games (English)
0 references
20 June 2002
0 references
The paper investigates the undiscounted repetition of an \(n\)-player common interest game. It is a game that has a unique Pareto-optimal vector of payoffs strictly dominating all other payoffs. The interest is focused to the strategies of such supergames which are computable within Church's thesis, and computable trembles on the strategies are introduced. The main result shows that if the trembles have sufficiently large support then the only equilibrium vector of payoffs that survives after many repetitions of the game is the Pareto-efficient one. This result is proved by backwards induction on the set of players. It is also shown that the main result fails in the case of a countable infinity of players.
0 references
cooperation
0 references
computability
0 references
repeat common interest games
0 references
perturbation
0 references
0.8982959389686584
0 references
0.7971729636192322
0 references
0.7801849842071533
0 references
0.7708149552345276
0 references
