Bargaining property of nucleolus and \(\tau\)-value in a class of TU-games (Q5948748)

The authors define the concept of pairwise bargained consistency with a reference point. They observe that the nucleolus of the bankruptcy game is a unique pairwise-modest (or greedy)-bargained consistent allocation. Similarly, the nucleolus of the pseudoconcave game with respect to superset of managers, is a unique pairwise-modest-bargained consistent allocation. The authors study if this property of the nucleolus holds for larger classes of games. They show that the nucleolus is a unique pairwise-modest (or greedy)-bargained consistent allocation in the class of games whose nonempty core is determined by one-person and \((n-1)\) person coalition constraints. It is also shown in this paper that the \(\tau \) value of a quasibalanced game is a unique pairwise-medium-bargained consistent allocation.