Cooperative decision making in common pool situations (Q5960179)

The referred book is devoted to the problem of rational behaviour of consumers who can use a common benefit where certain rivalry can be observed and in the situations in which it is difficult to implement some binding property rights. The main idea of the solution consists in using cooperation procedures specifying the consumptions of particular agents. The transferable utility cooperative games and their cores are the formal tools used for the modelling this approach. The book is divided into seven main chapters. The first one is of introductory character heuristically specifying the situation. The second chapter studies the dynamical resource management problem for an incomplete renewable resource in the centralized and decentralized case. In Chapter 3, some game properties and solution concepts are introduced. The main chapter Chapter 4, presents the basic problem described by a so-called joint production structure. The corresponding normal form game is derived to construct different cooperative game-theoretitical representations of the common pool situations. Remaining three chapters complete the basic results of Chapter 4. Namely, Chapter 5 continues the study of cooperation in common pool situations with special respect to the concept of the convexity of the game. Also the sixth chapter is devoted to extensions of the convexity property to more general convex production functions. Finally, Chapter 7 offers a summary of the achieved results and some conclusive remarks. The book is completed by a representative list of references.