On the safety of group manipulation (Q6062959)

From MaRDI portal

Jump to:navigation, search

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7761695

Language	Label	Description	Also known as
English	On the safety of group manipulation	scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7761695

Statements

scholarly article

0 references

On the safety of group manipulation (English)

0 references

Social Choice and Welfare

0 references

publication date

6 November 2023

0 references

MaRDI profile type

MaRDI publication profile

0 references

full work available at URL

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01469-z

0 references

0 references

Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for \(k\)-approval voting rules

0 references

Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

0 references

Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting

0 references

Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability

0 references

On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules

0 references

Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions

0 references

Is it ever safe to vote strategically?

0 references

Identifiers

zbMATH Open document ID

0 references

10.1007/s00355-023-01469-z

0 references

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

0 references

0 references

zbMATH DE Number

0 references

0 references

Sitelinks

Mathematics(1 entry)

mardi Publication:6062959

Retrieved from "https://portal.mardi4nfdi.de/w/index.php?title=Item:Q6062959&oldid=37574896"