Marginality and a characterization of the Owen graph value (Q6113210)

The paper provides an alternative axiomatic characterization of the Owen graph value, a solution concept for a class of cooperative games with transferable utility. The Owen graph value, introduced by \textit{M. Vázquez-Brage} et al. [Games Econ. Behav. 12, No. 1, 42--53 (1996; Zbl 0844.90124)], combines two variants of the Shapley value [\textit{L. S. Shapley}, Ann. Math. Stud. 28, 307--317 (1953; Zbl 0050.14404)], the Owen value and the Myerson value. The Owen value [\textit{G. Owen}, Lect. Notes Econ. Math. Syst. 141, 76--88 (1977; Zbl 0395.90095)] applies to games with coalition structure; that is, where including one player requires including all the players in his predetermined coalition. The Myerson value [\textit{R. B. Myerson}, Math. Oper. Res. 2, 225--229 (1977; Zbl 0402.90106)] applies to game with graph restricted communication; that is, where two players can't both be included unless they are connected within a predetermined network of links. The Owen graph value, in turn, extends both the Owen value and the Myerson value to cover games with both coalition structure and graph restricted communication. Both [\textit{M. Vázquez-Brage} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 12, No. 1, 42--53 (1996; Zbl 0844.90124)] and [\textit{J. M. Alonso-Meijide} et al., Math. Soc. Sci. 58, No. 2, 202--213 (2009; Zbl 1190.91010)] present axiomatic characterizations of the Owen graph value, but neither characterization includes a notion of marginality as an axiom. Marginality, the idea that ``a player's payoff depends only on her own productivity'', is an important feature of the Shapley value. The new characterization here shows that marginality plus three other axioms (relating to efficiency and equal treatment of players) yields the Owen graph value.