Fermionic operatorial model of a system with competitive and cooperative interactions (Q6145364)

The article ``Fermionic operatorial model of a system with competitive and cooperative interactions'' is of key relevance to those researching in econophysics, complexity and game theory. Methodologically, the work provides for a well-rounded and detailed review of the application quantum field-based methods to classical problems and, in this case, to a game theory problem involving cooperation versus competition. The methodology is focused specifically on the \((\mathcal{H}, \rho)\)-induced dynamics. From a game theory standpoint, the approach leads to an important point, since, while in traditional game theory zero-sum or non-zero-sum games are structurally distinct in their payoff matrix, in the field-based approach there is, as the authors show, a direct correspondence between the components in the interaction Hamiltonian and both profiles, that is, the zero-sum and the non-zero-sum interactions are both integrated in the interaction Hamiltonian, one in the form of a competitive interaction and another in a cooperative interaction. The problem addressed by the authors is an evolutionary one, with the advantage of different profiles being assessed by the wealth, which is worked within the quantum field formalism as a number operator. There are three major profiles: the competition profile (zero-sum-like interaction), the cooperation profile (non-zero-sum with win-win and lose-lose dynamics) and the opportunistic profile which can cooperate with one agent and compete with another. The authors show that the cooperative profile has an advantage in the game when an adaptive dynamics is introduced. In Section 2, the authors review the main formalism, this is a fundamental section for understanding the basic formalism and methodology. In Section 3, the authors address the dynamics with seven agents, three competitive, three cooperative and an opportunistic that competes with one of the competitive agents and cooperates with one of the cooperative agents. In the initial model, the evolution of the wealth is oscillatory, however, the cooperative agents' average wealth is higher than the competitive, while the opportunistic has the higher amplitude of the group with a maximum wealth higher than the average wealth of the competitive and cooperative agents, with the minimum wealth of the opportunistic agent being close to the maximum wealth of the competitive agents and the average wealth of the cooperative agents. This dynamics changes when the authors periodically apply a rule that introduces an adaptive dynamics that allows agents to change their attitudes depending on the evolution of their wealth. In this case, there is a damping of the amplitudes of the oscillations and the cooperative profile gains an evolutionary advantage in the game. The third model that the agents address, in Section 4, is a spatially extended model with 100 agents. Under the the adaptive rule, with change in agents' attitudes, cooperation has an evolutionary advantage over the competitive and opportunistic agents, with greater wealth achieved. In Section 5, concluding remarks are provided. Considering the main problem and results, the article provides for an important reference for the application of quantum field-based methods to social sciences in general and economics in particular, with special interest for the econophysics community. The work is also of relevance to complexity researchers working on the evolution of cooperation problem, a problem that has been approached within the evolutionary game theory and agent-based modeling, in particular in regard to the prisoner dilemma game. The application of quantum field-based methods to multiagent modeling is also an important point for complexity research. For game theory, the field-based methods open up the issue of multiple types of interaction profiles including both zero-sum and non-zero-sum interactions incorporated in the quantum field interaction Hamiltonians. In this way, the work is of importance for game theory in general and evolutionary game theory in particular. Finally, for those working on wealth distribution problems, the article provides for a relevant contribution that may lead to new research directions in regards to wealth distribution dynamics in evolutionary contexts.