The monoclus of a coalitional game (Q632964)

The authors propose two new solution concepts for coalitional games in the form \((N,v)\), called premonoclus (\({\mathcal M}^*(N,v)\)) and monoclus (\({\mathcal M}(N,v)\)), generalizing the classical single-valued solutions, prenucleolus and nucleolus. Premonoclus and monoclus are allocation scheme rules which assign payoffs to all players \(i\in N\) in all coalitions \(S\subset N\). They are defined with the help of the lexicographic ordering generalizing the definitions of prenucleolus and nucleolus, respectively. The nonemptiness, uniqueness and continuity of \({\mathcal M}^*(N,v)\) and \({\mathcal M}(N,v)\) and their mutual correlation are studied. It is also shown that the premonoclus \({\mathcal M}^*(N,v)\) can be found by solving a sequence of LP problems. The authors also define two other variants of \({\mathcal M}^*(N,v)\) and \({\mathcal M}(N,v)\), called \({\mathcal T}\)-premonoclus and \({\mathcal T}\)-monoclus, and show the coincidence of all the four solutions for cooperative games with population monotonic allocation scheme. The results of the paper are illustrated by several computational examples.