Making a start with the stit logic analysis of intentional action (Q652741)

The author's motivation comes from legal literature, which distinguishes between different degrees of intent in the performance of an action; for example, a recent textbook distinguishes between five such degrees in current American criminal law. The goal is to develop a formal framework adequate for their representation. A first step was taken in the author's paper [``Deontic epistemic stit logic distinguishing different modes of mens rea'', J. Appl. Log. 9, No. 2, 137--152 (2011; Zbl 1221.03017)], which considered lesser degrees of intention; the paper under review examines the two highest ones, known as those of `purposefully' and `knowingly' committing an act. Attention is thus centered on intentional action rather than pure intention, and the formal work uses a version of stit logic rather than the dynamic logic employed by \textit{P. R. Cohen} and \textit{H. J. Levesque} when they studied pure intention in their paper [``Intention is choice with commitment'', Artif. Intell. 42, No. 2--3, 213--261 (1990; Zbl 0721.03017)].