Strategic stability in repeated signaling games (Q687058)

This paper extends selection rules now used in the signaling literature (such as the Intuitive Criterion of the author and \textit{D. M. Kreps} [Q. J. Econ. 102, 179-221 (1987; Zbl 0626.90098)]) to a class of repeated signaling games, where each player can exchange the messages conditioned on his private information. STABAC (STAbility and BACkward induction) is defined as a procedure whereby forward induction arguments [see \textit{E. Kohlberg} and \textit{J.-F. Mertens}, Econometrica 54, 1003-1037 (1986; Zbl 0616.90103)] are applied in combination with the backward induction process. We specify the conditions under which any strategically stable outcome of a repeated signaling game includes an equilibrium that induces a stable equilibrium outcome in every subform, whence STABAC does not eliminate any stable outcome of the repeated signaling game.