Probabilistic unawareness (Q725064)

Summary: The modeling of awareness and unawareness is a significant topic in the doxastic logic literature, where it is usually tackled in terms of full belief operators. The present paper aims at a treatment in terms of partial belief operators. It draws upon the modal probabilistic logic that was introduced by \textit{R. J. Aumann} [``Interactive epistemology I: Knowledge'', Int. J. Game Theory 28, No. 3, 263--300 (1999; \url{doi:10.1007/s001820050111})] at the semantic level, and then axiomatized by \textit{A. Heifetz} and \textit{P. Mongin} [Games Econ. Behav. 35, No. 1--2, 31--53 (2001; Zbl 0978.03017)]. The paper embodies in this framework those properties of unawareness that have been highlighted in the seminal paper by \textit{S. Modica} and \textit{A. Rustichini} [``Unawareness and partitional information structures'', ibid. 27, No. 2, 265--298 (1999; \url{doi:10.1006/game.1998.0666})]. Their paper deals with full belief, but we argue that the properties in question also apply to partial belief. Our main result is a (soundness and) completeness theorem that reunites the two strands -- modal and probabilistic -- of doxastic logic.