The feedback equilibria of a differential game of capitalism (Q757223)

The paper deals with the workers vs. capitalists differential game originally proposed by \textit{K. Lancaster} [J. Pol. Econ. 87, 1092-1109 (1973)] and later extended by \textit{M. Pohjola} [J. Econ. Dyn. Control 6, 173-186 (1983)], \textit{T. Basar, A. Haurie} and \textit{G. Ricci} [ibid. 9, 101-125 (1985)] and others. For a discussion of the literature, see \textit{M. Pohjola} [in: Dynamic games and applications in economics, 7th Annu. Conf., Econ. Dyn. Control, London 1985, Lect. Notes Econ. Math. Syst. 265, 103-133 (1986; Zbl 0586.90109)]. The paper at hand extends the work by Basar, Haurie and Ricci by addressing the question of the existence of a feedback Stackelberg equilibrium and studies the equilibrium path in more detail, for example, convergence to steady state, monotonicity and sensitivity.