The nature of reflexive paradoxes. I (Q792304)

The aim of the paper is to determine the general conditions which characterise self-referential paradoxes and solutions thereto. The paper notes that many logical (set theoretic and semantic) paradoxes have premises of the form \(\exists x\forall y(\phi(y,x)\leftrightarrow \sim \phi(y,y)),\) which is a logical contradiction [\textit{J. F. Thomson} ''On some paradoxes'', Analytic Philosophy (First Series), 104-119 (1962)]. It observes that the scope of the innermost quantifier entails that \(x\neq y\) and so proposes to call any sentence of the form \(\exists x\forall y\psi(x,y)\) (where \(\psi\) is quantifier-free) such that \(\psi\) (x,y) entails \(x\neq y\) a reflexive contradiction. Any such \(\psi\) is indeed a logical contradiction, since it entails \(\exists x\forall y(x\neq y).\) Consequently, it is argued, a resolution of contradictions of this form will work iff any instantiation of the variable x is, for some reason, outwith the range of the variable y. The paper suggests a more general condition and corresponding resolution where \(\psi\) is of a more general form, but defers a precise statement of these to the second part [\textit{L. Goddard}, ibid 25, 27-58 (1984)]. An investigation of solutions which meet the appropriate requirements is deferred to the same paper. It is not clear to the reviewer that the aim of the paper is achieved. It is not obvious that all paradoxes (e.g. Burali-Forti's and the definability paradoxes) have a premise which is a reflexive contradiction. Even if this is right there are reflexive contradictions which are hardly paradoxical, e.g. \(\exists x\forall y(x\neq y),\) as the paper notes. And it cannot be argued that a resolution of the kind suggested will at least ensure consistency since even with the restriction noted \(\exists x\forall y((\phi(x)\wedge \sim \phi(x))\wedge x\neq y)\) (where \(\phi\) contains no variable other than x) entails a contradiction.