On weakly completely mixed bimatrix games (Q804480)

The Nash equilibrium set of a bimatrix game consists of a finite union of maximally convex subsets, the Nash components. A game is weakly completely mixed if there is a Nash component which consists completely of equilibria using all pure strategies with positive weight. It is proved that weakly completely mixed bimatrix games have exactly one completely mixed equilibrium. This equilibrium is a Nash component and therefore isolated. If (A,B) is a weakly completely mixed bimatrix game then (-A,-B) and \((P_ 1AP_ 2,P_ 3BP_ 4)\), where \(P_ i\) are arbitrary permutation matrices, have the same property. Both properties do not hold for completely mixed bimatrix games. In the last section the authors construct a weakly completely mixed bimatrix game which has a given strategy pair (p,q) as unique completely mixed equilibrium.