On the strong monotonicity of power indices (Q809907)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4211834
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| English | On the strong monotonicity of power indices |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4211834 |
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On the strong monotonicity of power indices (English)
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1991
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The paper is devoted to a special type of coalition games in normal form known as voting games. The main problem is to choose such power indices (powers of individual players) adequate to particular bargaining situations. It is shown that the significant criterion for this choice is the monotonicity of the power indices which means that the power of a player increases with his voting weight.
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coalition game
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weighted majority
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voting games
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power indices
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bargaining
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0.92223716
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0.87038887
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0.86814827
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