Unjust intergenerational allocations (Q810342)

The utilitarian criterion as well as the Rawlsian maximin principle are known to have some unconvincing implications when applied to problems of intergenerational equity. Maximin combined with egoistic preferences may perpetuate poverty while utilitarianism with positive discounting may suggest consumption paths which eventually approach zero although unbounded growth is feasible. The author pleads for restricting social choice to allocations which satisfy an ethical criterion of justice. An allocation is said to be unjust if there exists another feasible allocation with more total consumption and less relative inequality. In technologies for which waiting is productive only efficient and nondecreasing allocations remain after ruling out all unjust allocations. The author then focuses on those just allocations which altruistically minded generations would choose. (Altruism is here equivalent to utilitarianism with positive discounting.) It is shown that the resulting allocations would have equally been chosen if i) maximin were combined with altruism, ii) some condition of time-consistency is respected, and iii) the underlying technologies are productive and of specific types.