On the persistence of particles (Q816119)

The persistence of objects can be understood either as a single identity existing at two distinct times, (endurance) or alternatively as different stages of an object being present at different times (perdurance). Classical objects are the issue here, including ``point particles, which we think of as moving in a void'' or else `classical conintua, i.e. bodies whose composing matter entirely fills their volume'; (p.~234). Section 2 of the paper is devoted to metaphysical discussion and distinctions between endurantism and perdurantism, including a review of other writers' views, and brief introduction to ``pointillism'', the notion that ``the history of the world is fully described by all the intrinsic properties at all the various times of point-sized bits of matter.''(p.~240) Section 3 considers two representations of classical mechanical motion associated with the two different metaphysical views. The formalism is presented for each view along with an argument that these two different formalisms are in fact equivalent. According to the enduring view point particles are represented by world-lines in spacetime. Perdurism on the other hand requires a collection of shorter worldliness to represent ``stages'', and motion is represented by functions mapping time intervals to stage locations. The two representations are developed formally then shown to be equivalent. The analysis is then generalized and applied to extended bodies and multiple objects. Limitations are identified where `instantaneous' stages are proposed. Section 4 concerns identity of objects over time, arguing for common issues between the enduring and perduring points of view. The ``ontic- epistemic'' criterion of identity (``constitutive facts'' of persistence) are contrasted with the `conceptual-empirical' criterion (how we establish these facts). Qualitative similarity and causal relatedness are considered factors common to both metaphysical accounts and there is discussion of how we can move from such ``vague consensus'' to precise criteria. Identity of point particles is proposed in terms of their ``following timelike curves of maximum qualitative similarity'' (p.~252). Tracking the continuous curves of points occupied by matter thus becomes a method of distinguishing individuals, and this is developed in some detail. Finally a corollary of the Heine-Borel theorem in real analysis is invoked to refine the criteria for identity in terms of continuous functions on closed bounded intervals. The paper provides an unusual mix of philosophical discursiveness and technical formalism, in a paper acknowledged at the outset as a ``mixture of physics and philosophy'' (p.~236). The metaphysical positions are not adjudicated. The paper is rather an excursion into questions and results ``in the borderlands between the philosophy of persistence and the physics of motion.'' (p.~268). Only classical objects in classical motion are considered here - the challenge of quantum mechanics remains.